China’s naval expansion: economic imperatives, geopolitical tensions, and global security implications

October, 15th 2025

Written by C.B.

Photo: Philippines Coast Guard/AFP found on https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3261999/south-china-sea-philippines-sounds-alarm-about-coral-reef-damage-related-beijings-reclamation

On China’s national day (the 1st of October), the country “held a National Day flag-raising ceremony on a ship in the waters close to Scarborough Shoal” (The Diplomat). This South China sea islet has been the object of rivalry between China and the Philippines. This ceremony was backed by a broadcast message by CCTV stating that China will defend its control over this islet. Scarborough Shoal has been a subject of disputes especially concerning China’s efforts to prevent Filipino fishermen from entering the shoal. 

In 2019, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) disposed of 1.5 millions tonnage, making it the most important navy of Asia and the second navy in the world right behind the USA*. The rise of the Chinese navy is mostly based on its immense technological absorption capacity, backed by high government funding.

However, the navy has not always been so developed and powerful in China but was for a long time rather neglected, not able to keep up with technological innovation leading to its minor importance in the PLA until the nineties. However in 2019, the PLA’s navy (PLAN) now disposes of 600 warships which equals 1.5 millions tonnage but has also considerably developed its amphibious assault vehicles and naval aviation. Therefore, the PLAN can be considered the most important navy of Asia and also the second navy in the world right behind the USA*. The particularity of this mind-blowing development is also the fact that even if China has benefited from foreign technological input (mainly Russian), the rise of the Chinese navy is mostly based on its immense technological absorption capacity enjoying a high government financing. This incredible modernization is seen as necessary and as a considerable tool in the effort to commensurate with China’s enormous economic power.

Therefore we can wonder, to what extent is China's naval expansion primarily driven by economic imperatives, and how does this expansion both fuel geopolitical tensions and contribute to global security?

Firstly we will take interest in China’s navy history and why the navy developed so late and so efficiently. Secondly, we will see the key role of economic factors in China’s maritime strategy and navy’s importance. Finally we will consider how this vertiginous expansion can affect China’s relations with the other countries. 

  For China, the “century of humiliation” is inseparable from the vulnerability of its coasts to Western and Japanese intrusions. With the construction of major warships by the industrial powers, China is one of the main victims of the 19th century’s strategic shift towards seapower. The Qing dynasty and the first Republic collapsed because of their inability to defend themselves against projections of power by sea. However the new popular republic of China still focused on the build of terrestrial power rather than naval, however history can help us understand this focus. Indeed, during the civil war in China most of the fights occurred on land which did not help China develop its marine projection focusing more on its terrest enemies. The fact that the nationalist forces went to Taiwan to seek asylum and that the communists were not able to reach them clearly shows this lack of marine projection. In this context, the navy was only created in 1950 and still was embedded in the civil war, its main objective being to regain Taiwan and Hainan.  The latest was regained thanks to a naval operation the same year. Its missions are, thus, mainly coastal. The rise in naval power of China can be traced back to the economic modernisation drive that Deng Xiaoping launched in the late 1970s which erased the coastal defense mentality in favour of a more prominent role in the pacific region in order to resist “outside influences”. In the past, Chinese naval strategy was rooted in a “siege mentality”, feeling constantly threatened by outside forces. However, if China wanted to open up to the world and economically develop it necessitated overseas expansion. Unless the Chinese had a strong navy, their economic development and power remained dependent upon the will of others.  A turning point occurred in 95/96 in the Taiwan strait. After the election of Lee Teng-hui, an independentist, the Chinese government, alarmed, launched missile tests and a large-scale simulation of a landing in Taiwan. These actions were viewed by the US as a challenge to their protection of Taiwan and as a result the government deployed its navy (and its aircraft carrier) to dissuade Beijing of a real large-scale invasion. China’s navy could not keep up with the scope and height of the American navy especially face to face with the aircraft carrier which eventually led to the reconsideration of the importance of its navy.  

 As we have briefly stated above, the rise in naval power of China is deeply rooted to the economic modernization drive that Deng Xiaoping launched in the late 1970s. 90% of China’s trade relies on maritime transport, making the security of maritime trade routes vital for economic stability. Following the Montego Bay conference in 1984, China obtained the tenth maritime domain depriving China of any strait (through most of its trade goes) and any access to the pacific or indian ocean. According to Mahan, a maritime power is determined through certain criterias (Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History). One of them is geography which constitutes a determining point in China's case. Indeed, the country suffers from a strong confinement, its maritime territory being considerably smaller than its national territory (0,4 but 17,2 for France).  However, China, since its opening up in the seventies, relies heavily on exports (world’s factory) and on the security of those straits for its economic stability (and so social and political stability too) and energy supply too. China imports by maritime roads its energy flows, oil and gas necessary to its industry but also some alimentary ressources. This maritime industry represented  10% of its GDP in 2013. China lacks those essential ressources without maritime development and enforcement, its development relies on sea exports and imports which are forced to go through straits that the country does not control.  This division of the marine space creates an existential threat for the country leaving its stability to those controlling the major straits. It is what Hu jintao called in 2003 the “Malacca dilemma”. As a way to ensure China’s growing economy and stability, the government understood that the country needed to develop a stronger navy and a network of advanced bases to project its power on the different oceans, near crucial straits to ensure fluid exchanges and the security of trade. Another strategy that can be recently witnessed is the opening of new alternative routes in parallel to those that China does not entirely control. 

As we have seen, the rise of the PLAN is embedded in economic factors, China being dependent on exports and also imports of energy through crucial straits. However, the economic importance of the oceans has taken on another turn since 2011 and president Xi JinPing's announcement of the BRI initiative. As a reminder, and according to the official website, the BRI is a

trans-national economic network proposed and spearheaded by China. The idea of building the inter-continental economic network was first promoted by President Xi in 2013. Inspired by the ancient Silk Road, the development strategy aims to establish a new platform for international cooperation and to facilitate global development. The ancient Silk Road, which connected countries in Asia, Europe and Africa, started to take shape with Zhang Qian’s explorations of Central Asia in the Han dynasty. After centuries of development by the states along the trade route, Silk Road, in addition to the ‘Maritime Silk Road’, the maritime transport route which stretches from Quanzhou, Fujian to Italy and Egypt, not only played a significant role in cultural exchanges and trading among Asia, Europe and Africa, but also promoted interactions between the eastern and western civilisations.

Thus, this new project puts more pressure on the navy as the maritime roads are crucial to the development of the BRI and of new exchanges (and China’s expansion).  In this context, the navy is more of a way to support Chinese economic maritime exchanges as this new project also creates advanced logistics bases always accessible to the Chinese fleet. The Indian ocean is crucial for the Chinese government as most of the energy imported comes from there which can explain why a naval base was opened in Djibouti in 2017 and allowed the Chinese forces to be pre-positioned in proximity to its interest zone next to the Bab el-Mandeb strait (capacity of 10 000 people). China has also gained control over Myanmar’s Sittwe port from where China gets its energy for its Yunnan province (pipeline) not far from the Malacca strait. Further north, the Arctic branch of the BRI offers the advantage of being 30% shorter between China and northern Europe, but is only opened briefly each year due to global warming. Overall, the ambition of this new route reveals something : the rapprochement between China and Russia which can also be witnessed through the observation of their navies. Since 2012, the two have been conducting semi-annual joint-sea exercises together in different maritime areas.

The “missile crisis” also acted as a catalyst for China’s navy military modernization effort notably with the development of a new generation of surface and submarine vessels. Following the event, China acquired modern weapons systems from Russia including twelve Kilo-class submarines. The analysis of the strategy of US aircraft during the 95 Taiwan strait crisis also convinced China to acquire aircraft carriers or at least to find ways to destroy them. The first aircraft carrier of the Chinese navy is the Liaoning which was mainly used for training purposes. Another aircraft carrier would be under construction since 2015. As a result, in 15 years, the PLAN’s combat capabilities have been increased to meet two objectives. The first objective is maritime superiority in comparison to the Taiwanese Navy, the second was the prohibition of access to the zone to the American naval troops. This last objective can not be overlooked as the PLAN’s fleet and certain perfected sea missiles could have a dissuasive effect on the strategic behaviour of the USA in case of a Taiwan strait crisis. The pentagon already estimates that China already disposes of disruptive technologies which would overcomplicate an american intervention.  

China has approximately 70 different types of submarines which allows China to control a wide maritime area that can make it harder for the U.S. to operate freely in the region. However this large fleet is not without constraints. In fact, China's submarines cannot easily reach the open ocean; narrow passages in the island lines prevent them from doing so. The U.S. military presence in the region is also an obstacle to the projection of Chinese submarines as they can detect them. China must pass through these obstacles to access greater sea areas and so its capacity to go undetected is primordial. Howarth argues that if China gains control of Taiwan, it will eliminate this geographic disadvantage in one move, that would make the securing of Taiwan a top list objective. Apart from official military forces, China also features paramilitary forces often called the “sea dragons” which was regrouped in 2013 in the new corps of the coastguards. In the same register, China’s maritime militia should not be underestimated. This militia is composed of fishing boats and civilians who were given a military formation which enabled them to collect intelligence, to wage maritime guerrilla warfare and anti-aircraft missile fire. This militia is the one who tried to cut the very low frequency detection antennas towed by US intelligence vessels T-AGOS in the China Sea. In 2014 they were also sent to repel Vietnamese boats that wanted to oppose the presence of a drilling rig in the disputed waters between the two countries.

Apart from the economic importance of the PLA’s navy, Chinese leadership and military doctrines play a crucial role in the expansion of the navy. Admiral Liu Huaqing, often called the father of the modern Chinese navy, developed a naval strategy of offshore defense in 1986 which clearly influences today’s leadership. This strategy goes through three main phases.

The first one aims to achieve dominance within the first island chain, which runs from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to the South China Sea. ​The second one aims to expand influence up to the second island chain, stretching from the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Palau. Finally, by 2050, PLAN should be capable of intervening anywhere in the world. This final phase aligns with Xi JinPing’s "Chinese Dream" of national rejuvenation, ensuring China’s permanent and global naval reach. As defined by these two ambitions, China’s "Active Defense" strategy now emphasizes power projection as shown through the claimed ownership of more than 60% of the South China Sea and Taiwan. To reach its objectives, China plays with its maritime means and cultivates ambiguity through the creation of a “permanent threat” which should allow for preventive action to be taken when necessary. It has thus gradually acquired a network of naval bases in the South China Sea without risking confrontation with the major powers, none of which is adjacent to this maritime area. Its only military strength protects it : who would want to enter into a high intensity conflict with a nuclear power, the second navy in the world for the possession of shoals or uninhabited islets.

China claims not to have expansionist aims but refuses to submit to international jurisdiction and only deals with other states in the south china sea on a case-by-case basis in order to prevent them from uniting against China. 

As we have already seen , after WW2 a new world order was created by international conferences including the Montego Bay conference. As said before, because of this new world order, China is confined to a rather small maritime territory which can directly threaten her because of the importance of her maritime exchanges in her economic and political state. Furthermore, the conflict between China and the USA can be traced back to seas and oceans. To recap, China is limited in its expansion mainly because of two main elements. The first limit is the first line of islands which are geographically encircled by islands which limit her access to the pacific ocean (and also as we’ve seen the deployment of its submarines): it is made of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and the Indonesian archipelago. Those territories are under direct (or indirect) influence of the USA which undeniably limits China’s expansion and projection in the Pacific. The Malacca strait, as we have seen, is of capital importance for China as 80% of its energy imports goes through this strait. However it is under the control of allies of the USA and if Washington wanted to, it could impose a blocus which would effectively affect China through the cut of its energy imports. To face these constraints and the US’ important influence in the region, China is trying to impose its own interpretation of international law especially by questioning the Montego bay convention. As a reminder, this conference defines exclusive economic zones as a zone where a country can exploit resources as far as 200 miles from its coasts. China has ratified this convention but does not apply it in the south china sea pretending that history matters more than modern international law. According to Beijing, the south china sea has always been under Chinese control, Taiwan is a part of China and the Diaoyu islands also belong to China (even though it is under Japanese control). Following this logic, China deploys substantial means to regain its historic territories. For example, China builds military bases on contested islands like the Paracels to reinforce its presence, it also deploys its navy in the region to intimidate other countries and also refuses to accept the international court of justice’s decisions like the one from 2016 which invalidated its claims on the south china sea. This policy reinforces regional tensions and pushes the USA to reinforce its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. China wants to restore what it sees as its historical right over the region. But in doing so, it is in direct opposition to international rules and creates multiple tensions with its neighbours and the United States. A lot of the South China sea is claimed by China based on geographer Zheng Zihue’s map drawn in 1946 which included a "nine-line" line that shows Chinese claims as its territories that overlaps with the exclusive economic zones of several neighbouring countries. To explore these tensions and China’s belligerent policy, three cases are interesting and particularly relevant: the conflicts with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. 

The main conflict concerns the Diaoyu islands which are claimed by China, Japan (which officially administrates the islands) and Taiwan. In 2012, the Japanese government decided to buy these islands from a Japanese owner, which caused a strong reaction from China and Taiwan. In 2013, China called the islands "core interest", a term usually reserved for areas like Taiwan, further heightening the tensions. The situation worsened when, in the same year, China created an air defence identification zone (ADAZ) that included the Diaoyu islands. This situation has led to a premiere since WW2 as Japan strengthened its military budget and reviewed its peace-keeping constitution, with a view to allowing its armed forces to fight alongside their allies when needed. In April 2014, US President Obama, on a state visit to Japan, first stated that the Senkaku Islands are covered by the security treaty which obliges the United States to defend Japan if it were attacked. As a consequence, Japan increased its military budget and officially put into service the Izumo, an aircraft carrier, its biggest ship. 

Additionally to this conflict, another friction happened between China and South Korea concerning Leodo submerged rock which South Korea is in control of and on which it constructed a scientific research center. However China claims the maritime region all around it. Even if the two countries have officially agreed to settle this issue by discussion around Leodo, tensions are not erased as coastguards and fishermen keep clashing sometimes even resulting in death. 

China also has a long history of rivalry with Vietnam which can be also put into perspective today notably through the example of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1979. Multiple incidents illustrate the tensions between the two countries. For example, in 1988, China and Vietnam fought to control the Fiery Cross resulting in the death of 70 Vietnamese sailors. More recently, in 2014, China caused an incident in the South China Sea near the Paracel Islands that exacerbated tensions with Vietnam. These tensions and Chinese aggressiveness lead to unprecedented events and rearmament of certain countries who had renounced it or not granted it as a priority. China’s actions are widely criticized by the international community, especially by neighboring countries but also by the US. After the 2014 incident, John Kerry and Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam, met and after forty years of embargo, the US started considering selling arms to Vietnam in order to ensure its safety and be able to counter Chinese actions in the region. 

However Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the USA are not the only countries feeling threatened by the PLAN’s rise of power and Chinese maritime strategy, the Philippines also believes that China constitutes a considerable threat. As a consequence, the country initiated a procedure against China in front of the international court of justice (la Hague). Nevertheless China refuses to unveil a solution on this basis and prefers to settle an agreement bilaterally. The Philippines, conscious of not being able to weigh in, decided to move closer to the US leading, in 2014, to the signature of a ten-year pact between the two countries, increasing the U.S. military presence. This case, and especially China’s position in this case, clearly highlights China’s strategy of "slicing and dicing" consisting in taking small but continuous actions without provoking direct war but making it possible to change the situation in its favor. Robert Haddick, a consultant with the U.S. Special Forces Staff describes this technique as “(...) a slow accumulation of small actions, none of which can constitute casus belli, but which, over time, lead to a major strategic change”.

The examples developed before clearly show that China is multiplying its shares in the region but refuses to negotiate with several countries at the same time, preferring to deal with each country separately to avoid them uniting against it this technique rapidly becoming systemic and almost seemingly unbreakable. Other strategies complete this overall strategy like the unilateral (and illegal) control of fishing activities in the south china sea which started in 2013 prohibiting foreign vessels from fishing without a licence with really severe sanctions. China is also developing a strategy of armament of  artificial islands on reefs and inhabitable islands justifying their existence as research centers or fishing spots while some of them are actually used for military purposes.  As a global power, the USA is a part of regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific. They keep good relations with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines and the Obama administration put the Asia-pacific region as one of its top-priorities with the famous pivot to Asia. In May 2014 in Singapore, the US Secretary of Defense, described the four principles of the US action in the region: peaceful resolution of conflicts, promotion of a regional cooperation architecture, enhancement of the capabilities of US allies, strengthening of US defence capabilities in the region. In March 2015, the US Navy, the Marine Corps and the US Coast guards released their new joint strategy argumenting for the relocation of 60% of the fleet of 308 warships in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The ambiguity of China’s maritime ambitions and actions underscores the importance of China’s integration into cooperative security structures and even multilateral security regimes which has now become a real and important concern in international relations and overall for many countries especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

Apart from tension generated by the development of the PLAN and of the naval strategy of China, another implication of the rise of the PLAN, often overlooked, is the increasing participation of the Chinese navy in international intervention and has taken a more important place in Chinese naval diplomacy. This turn of naval diplomacy is also deeply rooted in Chinese economic objectives by, for example, intervening against piracy in the Indian ocean off the coasts of Somalia. In December 2008, Beijing decided to send a fleet of two missile destroyers and a logistics support ship to the area to fight against piracy. In 2004, Hu Jintao gave a speech on the PLA’s “new historical missions” including the contribution to world peace and development. Military Operations Other Than War are increasingly important in China’s maritime strategy. The 2008 White Paper even states that China’s navy must “gradually develop its capabilities to conduct integrated command operations in distant seas to counter non-traditional threats”. Surprisingly, China is also more and more involved in humanitarian assistance in Africa, Asia and South America with its hospital ship Arche de paix also participating in the evacuation of its nationals in Libya in 2011, then in Yemen in 2015 never taking unrequired UN mandated initiatives or violating the state consent.  

To conclude, China’s policy and strategic actions in the Asia-pacific region has met, since 2007, more firmness of the country notably involving more patrols or fishing prohibitions to its neighbours which is, in itself, allowed by the important power differences between the PLAN and other navies in the region.  However, the importance of economic factors in the region, and especially for China which is trying to support its maritime trade, plays a stabilizing role along with the presence of the first navy in the world, the USA navy which contains the PLAN’s expansion in the region.  

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