"Crossing the river by feeling the stones"(摸着石头过河): China’s policy experimentation.

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Deng XiaoPing (邓小平), former Chinese PM, source : Jana Hochbach on Pinterest

In China, the provision of public goods and services has been largely decentralized to local governments. An example of this decentralization is the 1994 tax-sharing scheme reform which makes the local governments responsible for the provision of public goods. Policy experimentation in the case of China can be described as a deliberate, structured methodology. Indeed by empowering local units to create new approaches to specific objectives, the central government generates innovative policy models for potential nationwide scaling. This localized testing serves as a precursor to formal legislation, allowing for evidence-based refinements in a controlled setting before these measures are eventually used nation-wide. This fragmented state power helps China maintain stability and instate dynamism to contain social changes and improve citizens’ satisfaction. Therefore, an important part of policy-making in China depends on local experimentation allowing small scale changes before implementing those same changes in the entire country, a strategy referred to as “crossing the river by feeling the stones” by Deng XiaoPing. On another hand, these local experimental policies can also only be fitting for specific areas, China being a big country with different needs according to different provinces. Experimental policies often focus on fixing systemic issues in underdeveloped areas by addressing their specific challenges. Wealthier regions may already have established infrastructure, whereas poorer areas need policy interventions the most. For example the abolishment of school fees in rural China due to the education reform study targeted policy reduced economic burdens on rural families and increased demand for government responsibility in funding education. Additionally, experimental policies allow governments to test reforms in underdeveloped areas first, ensuring they work before expanding them nationwide. The example of Special economic zones is very telling as it was, firstly, a way to reform China, opening the country to the world and more precisely to foreign investment and market economy. It is a way for the government to ensure support for large-scale reforms while also preventing large-scale failures. 

Nowadays, authoritarian regimes  have increasingly experimented with controlled forms of political participation and deliberation leading to a new form of “hybrid” regimes including, apart from an authoritarian rule, elections, consultative forums or even other political parties. It is now also the case of China because of its experimental policies which are often local leading to granting more power to the local governments and local populations. China is, indeed, now characterized by a wide range of deliberative practices like village level elections for example. These deliberative methods, in the context of policy experimentation, are important for policy makers as they seek guidance in imposing the best possible policies while also seeking legitimacy to support their decisions. Even though policy experimentation (especially local policy experimentation) seems (superficially) like a step towards democratization, we need to realize that these deliberative methods are actually limited in scope and only focused on particular problems of governance, they are thus not generalized. This is what Baogang He and Mark E. Warren call deliberative authoritarianism, a form of deliberation that is real but also very much compatible with an authoritarian regime and used by the political leadership for greater purposes. In this context it is also important to mention that policy experimentation also allows China to maintain such a strong non-democratic regime by adapting to each region's needs or even just providing appearances of increased popular participation making China’s state organization adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent. Thus, elites control not just what policies or issues are deliberated, but also the forums, levels of organization, timing, and duration as the deliberation are part of an authoritarian system which strictly controls its citizens. These adapting mechanisms can be seen through different methods adopted by the state, Nathan cites some of them “increasingly norm bound succession process, an increasing use of merit based considerations in top leadership selection, an increasing functional differentiation and specialization of state organizations, and new participatory institutions that enhance the CCP’s legitimacy”. 

However, we must keep in mind that China’s opening up to deliberative methods walks hand in hand with experimental policy-making (local or national) as these deliberative methods were always developed following functions and actual needs from this perspective. That way, the Chinese government can pursue its dream of great national rejuvenation, making China a top actor in the world while continuously maintaining a form of authoritarianism that would not have survived without a more flexible form of governance. Indeed most public deliberations in China today concern actual governance issues. Even though China grants some political rights, they are limited in scope and not always enforced, that way the CCP keeps full control over major decisions. Furthermore, the use of deliberation in China’s case is not so surprising as it is also embedded in an important cultural factor: Confucianism. Confucian tradition encouraged elite discussion and consultation on national affairs and in imperial times, scholars often debated in public forums. Consequently, as an outcome of this confucian tradition, came the idea that rulers should listen to the people.  This tradition did not lose its footing after the end of imperial China as a majority could believe so, it was still used after the revolution. Under Mao Zedong, a special leadership method was promoted called the “mass line” in which the official engaged with the people to understand their struggles. However, these consultations were not true deliberation because they lacked real fairness, rights, and procedures. Instead, they were elite-controlled ideological sessions. Ever since the 80s, China has developed a more structured form of deliberation based on forums allowing people to discuss governance issues. It is, in this period of time, that village elections and administrative reforms were introduced, increasing before limited public participation. Thus, instead of forced “political study”, forums today are called heart-to-heart talks, emphasizing open discussion. 

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests led to a crackdown on democratic movements, slowing down political reforms. But after repression, CCP leaders realized that completely ignoring public input could lead to instability, and so decided to continue controlled deliberative practices as a way to manage dissent. In 1991, President Jiang Zemin even promoted both electoral and consultative democracy meaning that China could potentially adopt limited elections, mainly at the village level and regularly hold discussions through the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a relatively weak institution in the government. Ever since, village meetings have become common and officials consult citizens about local issues like roads, schools, and land contracts. The 1995-2005 National Survey even shows that many decisions were made in village meetings, but a large percentage of people were still unaware of these processes. In fact, a deeper analysis of local realities often reveal that protests and grassroots resistance often push local officials to engage in deliberation especially in rural areas. In the case of urban areas, many consultative meetings are also held to involve citizens in local governance and so local (and national) policy experimentation to the point where some public hearings became mandatory. In fact, the Legislation Law of 2000 requires public hearings to be part of the process for new legislation. In general, local levels tend to have more participatory and deliberative practices while higher-level national institutions are increasingly deliberative but still under government control. The government still controls the agenda and outcomes. Therefore, deliberation happens in China allowing the government to instate efficient and adapted local policies while also experimenting with deliberation in itself but strict government boundaries still exist and constrain those practices. Eventually deliberative authoritarianism helps the CCP to manage public dissatisfaction without giving up power while also giving even more legitimacy to the central government in cases of experimental policies. Indeed, even though local governments are the ones responsible for implementing local policies and instauring local deliberation forums, the central government is credited more by citizens for the policy's success and the allowance of these deliberation methods. This can be largely understood because of the importance of the media and its influence crediting first and foremost the central government for these advancements. Therefore policy experimentation is not only useful in economic and development terms but mostly serves the purpose of maintaining regime support. 

According to Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, this experimentation of China is not without any dangers. The authors notice a remarkable built-in contradiction that could create instability. Indeed, by formalizing rules and allowing some decision-making autonomy, it may be creating conditions for future democratization. 

To operationalize the theory of policy experimentation, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) serve as the preeminent example of how China transformed its governance model. Initiated in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping to combat economic stagnation, SEZs were designed as testing grounds for market liberalization. By designating four modest coastal cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen) as experimental zones, the CCP strategically distanced these experiments from the political center in Beijing while leveraging their proximity to markets like Hong Kong and Taiwan. The SEZ model deviated from the traditional planned economy by introducing three pillars of reform:

• Market Decoupling: Price controls were relaxed, and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were pushed toward profit-driven models ; 

  
  

• Institutional Innovation: These zones pioneered private property rights and contract-based labor, concepts that were previously non-existent in Maoist China ; 

  
  

• Legal Frameworks: SEZs established commercial law systems and arbitration courts that were later adopted nationally to align China with global trade standards.

  
  

Through this policy approach, Shenzhen transformed from a fishing village of 30,000 into a global tech hub of over 17 million in only four decades. Its success was predicated on regulatory autonomy, allowing local officials to bypass national economic plans, set tax rates, and relax Hukou (residency) barriers to attract migrant labor. Following the success of these trials, the model expanded in 1984 to 14 coastal cities including Shanghai. This gradualism (crossing the river by feeling the stones) allowed the CCP to maintain controlled flexibility. By labeling these shifts as "experiments," the leadership could bypass ideological resistance from conservative factions of the CCP while containing the risks of potential failure within a limited area. Furthermore, the SEZ mechanism creates a feedback loop that reinforces authoritarian legitimacy. Successful local officials are rewarded with career advancement, creating a meritocratic incentive to innovate within the party’s boundaries. Despite an explicit success, the targeting of certain cities was criticized by many arguing that such a policy actually increased geographical disparities between inland regions and coastal regions leading to a developmental gap. Additionally, the autonomy granted to these zones can lead to policy fragmentation, where different regions implement national mandates with varying degrees of transparency. 

Ultimately, SEZs demonstrate that China’s economic "miracle" was not a product of random growth, but a result of the same structured experimentation seen in its deliberative practices. By allowing local divergence from the "beaten path," the CCP has successfully utilized economic liberalization to reinforce, rather than undermine, its centralized grip on power.

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